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Preserving the Border Search Doctrine 
in a Digital World 
REPRODUCING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AT THE 
BORDER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 23, 1997, a man arrived with his family 
at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York (“JFK”) 
en route to his suburban home in Arlington, Texas.1  The 
traveler, Wadih El-Hage, was detained by U.S. Customs 
officials2 who proceeded to search his luggage and photocopy 
materials found therein before returning his belongings and 
  
 1 United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023, 2001 WL 30061, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001); Oriana Zill, A Portrait of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist, 
PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/ 
elhage.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). 
 2 In March 2003, the United States Customs Service was transferred from 
Treasury Department control to the newly created Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”).  The Future is Now, U.S. CUSTOMS TODAY (U.S. Customs Serv., Washington, 
D.C.), Feb. 2003, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2003/February/ 
future.xml.  The Service, renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”), joined twenty-two federal agencies under the new department including the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Transportation Security Administration, 
the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service.  CBP is a consolidation of the 
former U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Border Patrol, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.  The 
agency currently functions under the Border and Transportation Security directorate 
within Homeland Security and shares responsibilities with two sister agencies: 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (“USCIS”).  CBP is largely responsible for preventing the import and export of 
contraband while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel; ICE operates as 
the largest investigative arm of Homeland Security; and USCIS is responsible for the 
administration of immigration and naturalization adjudication functions.  DHS, 
Department Subcomponents and Agencies, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ 
display?theme=9 (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). 
  Homeland Security governs over 170,000 workers and is the third largest 
employer in the executive branch following the Defense Department and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs.  Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: The 
Reorganization Plan; Establishing New Agency is Expected to Take Years and Could 
Divert It from Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at A14.  
  Throughout this note, Customs and Border Protection officers will be 
referred to as both “Customs officials” and “CBP officials” since earlier case law retains 
the former terminology.   
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allowing him to continue his journey.3  El-Hage was later 
named one of fifteen defendants charged with 267 discrete 
criminal offenses in connection with the 1998 bombings of the 
United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania.4  El-Hage’s effort in a later criminal 
proceeding to suppress the photocopied evidence as “fruit of the 
poisonous tree”5 was denied by the Southern District Court of 
New York.6  The Court rejected his claim that the JFK search 
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, thus tainting the 
evidence obtained.7  The Court concluded that not only was the 
initial search valid, but the mass reproduction of his documents 
was constitutionally permissible.8 
For illustrative purposes, imagine the individual 
searched is not an alleged member of an international terrorist 
network, but simply the occasional traveler returning home 
from a popular vacation spot such as Mexico or Jamaica.9  
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers do not search the 
papers he or she may be carrying in his or her briefcase or 
pocketbook.  Instead, they search a BlackBerry10 containing 
  
 3 Bin Laden, 2001 WL 30061, at *2. 
 4 United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 225, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  On 
August 7, 1998, simultaneous bombs at the two embassies killed 224 people (including 
twelve Americans) and injured thousands.  David Johnston & Andrew C. Revkin, 
Threats & Responses: The Methods; Officials Say Their Focus is on Car and Truck 
Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at A13.  
  El Hage was convicted in May 2001 of conspiracy to kill United States 
nationals and perjury for statements made during a grand jury proceeding.  Zill, supra 
note 1.  El Hage and three co-conspirators, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-’Owahli, 
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, and Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, were sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of release.  Benjamin Weiser, A Nation Challenged: The 
Courts; 4 Are Sentenced to Life in Prison in 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 19, 2001, at A1.   
  El Hage, a naturalized U.S. citizen, is believed to have been one of Osama 
bin Laden’s top aides.  See Zill, supra note 1.  Allegedly bin Laden’s personal secretary, 
El Hage maintains that he only assisted the al Qaeda leader in his legitimate business 
affairs which included a tannery, farms, a construction firm, a transport business, and 
two investment companies.  Id.  
 5 See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (establishing 
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which states that underlying police 
misconduct that violates the Fourth Amendment may taint evidence obtained by law 
enforcement, thus making it inadmissible). 
 6 Bin Laden, 2001 WL 30061, at *3-4. 
 7 Id. at *4. 
 8 Id. at *4 n.7.  
 9 See infra note 240 and accompanying text.  
 10 A BlackBerry is a hand-held, wireless internet device manufactured by the 
Canadian company Research in Motion.  See BlackBerry, http://www.blackberry.com 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2006).  With an estimated 200 million users in the United States, 
the BlackBerry plays a critical role in the operation of the nation’s leading industries 
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months worth of personal communications and business 
related emails, or an iPod with over 20,000 personal 
photographs as well as an organizer and address book.11  The 
officers then proceed to download and copy the electronically 
stored information before returning the device and allowing the 
passenger to continue his or her trip home.  This scenario gives 
rise to privacy concerns not likely to be encountered during a 
traditional inspection of paper documents.  The quantity and 
quality of personal materials that can be stored in a personal 
digital assistant (PDA) or laptop computer appears to make the 
search and duplication of digital information substantially 
more invasive.12  The hypothetical inspection described above 
seems excessive and unjustified, however, this note will 
demonstrate that it is not.  CBP’s authority to inspect laptop 
computers or electronic hand-held devices and to subsequently 
reproduce files contained therein is not only constitutionally 
permissible but essential for the effective policing of our 
international border.  In the digital era, the advent of the 
mobile electronics market has given individuals the ability to 
conceal incriminating evidence effortlessly—information that 
may be needed for the successful prosecution of hundreds of 
different federal criminal offenses.13  CBP must be able to 
respond to this threat. 
The Supreme Court has recently indicated that objects 
such as vehicles may be searched at the border without 
reasonable suspicion.14  A similar approach has been used to 
validate the suspicionless border search of computers and 
computer disks, holding that the inspection of these devices 
may be equated with the examination of traditional carry-on 
items.15  Additionally, CBP has the authority to photocopy 
paper documents such as letters, address and date books, and 
  
and professions, including Wall Street.  Paul Taylor, RIM Pleads for BlackBerry in 
Patent Case, FIN. TIMES (U.S.A.), Jan. 19, 2006, at 23. 
 11 See infra Part V.A. 
 12 Id. 
 13 In addition to its own regulations, CBP is responsible for enforcing over 
400 laws on behalf of over forty federal agencies.  CBP, CBP Cargo Examinations, 
http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/port_activities/cargo_examinations.xml (last 
visited July 31, 2006). 
 14 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-55 (2004). 
 15 See, e.g., United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding the border search of laptop computers as reasonable inspection of cargo). 
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receipts examined during routine searches.16  Only the 
reproduction of those materials is subject to a standard of 
reasonable suspicion; the initial inspection is not.17  This note 
will argue that the authority to reproduce paper material, 
when read in light of recent decisions concerning inanimate 
objects and electronic equipment, must be extended to allow for 
the reproduction of digital information stored in laptops, flash 
drives, memory sticks, and PDAs during a border search.  
Despite heightened privacy concerns regarding the volume of 
personal communications that may be stored within computers 
and hand-held devices, this note will demonstrate that the 
extension of this authority is critical to the maintenance of 
border integrity and the security of our nation in an 
increasingly digitalized world.18  The appropriate solution to 
address these privacy concerns is not to restrict CBP border 
search authority or the ability to reproduce evidence found 
during an inspection.  Instead, the Agency must adopt a policy 
of non-retention and non-dissemination when the replicated 
evidence is deemed no longer to have evidentiary, 
prosecutorial, or investigative value.19  This proposal, coupled 
with the inherent limits of CBP enforcement powers, will be 
more than sufficient to ensure that border inspection authority 
is not eroded while simultaneously protecting the privacy 
interests of those international travelers who have not violated 
federal law.20  
Part II of this note will provide an overview of the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures21 and explain how this constitutional protection is 
  
 16 See, e.g., United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738-39 (5th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (E.D.N.Y 1996), aff’d, 159 F.3d 
1349 (2d Cir. 1998); State v. Codner, 696 So. 2d 806, 810-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 17 United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023, 2001 WL 30061, at *4 
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001) (citing Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 185, 191).  Reasonable 
suspicion is defined as “‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the [specific 
individual]’ of . . . smuggling.”  United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 
541-42 (1985) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
 18 Customs officers are in a unique law enforcement position.  While they do 
not have general police powers, officers do have the opportunity “to look for evidence 
of . . . wrongdoing [and to present such evidence] obtained during a valid border search 
to criminal prosecutors.”  Jon Adams, Rights at United States Borders, 19 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 353, 366-67 (2005).  However, the evidence is still subject to exclusionary rules if it 
was obtained through CBP misconduct.  Id. at 367.  See infra Part IV.B for further 
discussion of the limits on CBP officers’ powers. 
 19 See Heidy v. U.S. Customs Serv., 681 F. Supp. 1445, 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1988). 
 20 See infra Part V.D. 
 21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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inapplicable at the United States international border or its 
functional equivalent.22  This section will explain the 
traditional distinctions between various types of border 
searches and the suspicion-less standard adopted by the 
Supreme Court regarding the search of personal property.23  
Part III will examine the ability of CBP officials to search 
laptop computers and diskettes under this framework.24  Part 
IV will examine the government’s authority established by 
United States v. Fortna25 not only to search personal property 
but to photocopy paper material as well.26  This section will 
explore the scope of the Fortna decision as well as the limits 
placed on the government’s ability to copy,27 retain, and 
disseminate such material.28  Part IV will conclude by applying 
the Fortna holding to electronically stored information.  This 
section will explain that current case law regarding 
photocopying, when correctly read together with the recent 
decisions concerning laptop searches, creates the ability to 
reproduce electronic files under a standard of reasonable 
suspicion.  Part V will demonstrate the critical need for this 
enhanced authority and refute several arguments to the 
contrary.  Section A will address the unique nature of 
electronic devices, namely the storage capacity that raises 
privacy concerns for travelers and presents a unique law 
enforcement challenge to Customs.  Section B will address the 
  
 22 An example of what is deemed the functional equivalent of the 
international border would be an airport serving as the final destination for a nonstop 
international flight.  United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1986).  A 
functional equivalent may also be at a point marking the confluence of two or more 
roads extending from the actual border.  Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 
266, 272-75 (1973) (holding a search conducted twenty-five miles from the United 
States border did not occur at the functional equivalent despite the fact that it was a 
highway route commonly used by undocumented noncitizens). 
 23 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004).  
 24 See, e.g., United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
laptop computers are “cargo” within the meaning of searchable items under 19 U.S.C. § 
1581(a) (2000)). 
 25 796 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 26 This authority includes the inspection and reproduction of both outbound 
and inbound materials sent through shipping services not accompanying a passenger 
traveling internationally.  See United States v. Seljan, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 
(C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 27 See People v. LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395-96 (App. Div. 1994) (holding 
that the copying of materials during a border search is limited to the laws customs 
officials may enforce). 
 28 See, e.g., Heidy v. U.S. Customs Serv., 681 F. Supp. 1445, 1449-50 (C.D. 
Cal. 1988) (holding that photocopies of non-seditious material obtained during a valid 
border search were not to be retained by law enforcement agencies); see also infra Part 
V.D. 
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fact that despite concerns regarding the disclosure of personal 
information, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the border context.  Section C will examine the devastating 
consequences of the failure to apply the Fortna holding to 
digital information.  Finally, Section D will conclude by 
emphasizing that existing protections and the implementation 
of a non-retention policy adequately serve the interests of both 
CBP and international travelers.  
II. THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE 
A. An Exception to the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.29  
This protection was created largely as a response to the 
English and colonial era law enforcement practice of entering 
private homes and conducting invasive searches for criminal 
evidence without probable cause.30  By including this safeguard 
in the Bill of Rights, the drafters wished to ensure that such 
intrusive, unreasonable violations of legitimate privacy 
expectations31 did not occur in the United States unless certain 
preliminary requirements were met.32  The Fourth Amendment 
mandates that a warrant be issued based on probable cause 
  
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 30 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (“It is familiar history 
that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general 
warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment.” (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886)); see also 
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536 
(2005).   
  Probable cause is established when the magistrate issuing the warrant 
determines that “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983). 
 31 A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society considers 
reasonable is infringed.  Laura Hill, Note, To Squeeze or Not to Squeeze?: A Different 
Perspective, 37 TULSA L. REV. 425, 426 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “no 
squeeze” rule as applied to law enforcement officers’ ability to search luggage on 
buses). 
 32 See Kerr, supra note 30, at 536. 
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prior to commencing the search.33  The warrant must not only 
describe the place to be searched but also the person or things 
to be seized.34  The unreasonable search of a person’s home 
remains the principal evil against which the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.35  The government may enter one’s 
personal abode to search and seize possessions only if it has 
obtained a warrant or an exception applies to the particular 
situation.36  However, this protection is not an absolute 
constitutional right.37  Its application necessarily hinges on the 
reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy in a 
given situation.38  
At the United States border or its functional equivalent, 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy; an exception to 
the Fourth Amendment applies.39  Historically, the Executive 
branch and specifically the U.S. Customs Service have enjoyed 
plenary power at the border.40  There exists a “longstanding 
recognition that searches at our borders without probable 
cause and without a warrant are nonetheless ‘reasonable’ [and 
have] a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.”41  In 
  
 33 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 584 (“As it was ultimately adopted . . . the [Fourth] 
Amendment . . . require[s] that warrants be particular and supported by probable 
cause.”); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 (1979) (“The Fourth amendment directs that 
‘no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. 
amend IV)); see also Kerr, supra note 30, at 536. 
 34 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 35 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (holding 
unlawful the electronic surveillance of defendant’s conversations without prior judicial 
approval). 
 36 See Kerr, supra note 30, at 536. 
 37 “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”  Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted) (holding that a person may 
reasonably rely on the protections of the Fourth Amendment when he or she enters a 
public telephone booth to have a private conversation). 
 38 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 39 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004) (citing United 
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).  
 40 Customs officials may board vessels and search any “vehicle, beast, or 
person” suspected of illegally bringing goods into the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 482 
(2000), and further, CBP officers may inspect the baggage of all persons arriving in the 
United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1496 (2000).  Other federal officials may be authorized to 
conduct border searches as well.  See, e.g., 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2000) (permitting Coast 
Guard officials to make inspections, searches, and seizures on the high seas and all 
other waters within U.S. jurisdiction); United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77 
(1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a Puerto Rican drug unit was authorized under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(i) (2000) to make customs seizures). 
 41 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).  The first customs 
statute, Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, 1 Stat. 29, was passed by the same Congress that 
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United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Supreme Court 
explained the justification for this broad authority, citing the 
inherent right of an independent, sovereign nation to protect 
itself by examining the people and articles moving in or out of 
the country.42  The Court upheld the authority of Customs to 
detain a suspected cocaine smuggler and emphasized that 
searching people and their affects is critical national security.43  
At the international border, the federal government’s 
obligations to collect duties and its protectionist interest in 
preventing the entry of stolen goods44 and controlled 
substances45 is at its “zenith.”46  The sovereign’s compelling 
security interests must be balanced against the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections and the privacy rights of arriving or 
departing individuals and their personal property.47  At the 
border, the scales clearly tip in the government’s favor.48  
B. The Distinction between Routine and Non-Routine 
Border Searches 
Within the border search context, inspections have 
typically been characterized as either suspicion-less and 
routine, or physically invasive and non-routine.49  In order to 
conduct routine border searches, Customs inspectors do not 
  
would present a proposal for the Fourth Amendment to state legislatures less than two 
months later.  Id. at 616.  This statute distinguished those searches which take place in 
the interior and require a warrant upon probable cause from those which are required 
at the border to enforce customs laws and duties, giving Customs nearly plenary power 
at the border.  Id. at 616-17. 
As this Act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the 
original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that 
body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable,’ and 
they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment. 
Id. at 617 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)).  Thus, the notion 
that border searches are exempt from Fourth Amendment requirements is well 
established and has long been embraced by the Supreme Court.  Id. 
 42 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
153-54 (1925)). 
 45 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 (citing United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 46 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
 47 See United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 794-95 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment applies equally to persons 
departing from the United States). 
 48 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539-40. 
 49 See id. at 538-41. 
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need to produce a warrant, show probable cause, or even 
possess reasonable suspicion.50  Accordingly, CBP officers may 
search carry-on bags and checked luggage, conduct canine 
sniffs or pat-downs,51 photograph and fingerprint travelers,52 
and even disassemble the gas tank on a vehicle without an 
independent trigger53 for the search.54  Non-routine searches on 
the other hand, are characterized by a more physically 
intrusive nature and typically involve procedures such as strip 
searches, body cavity searches, involuntary x-rays, and 
physical detention.55  These inspections implicate the Fourth 
  
 50 Id. at 538.  See also United States v. Singh, 415 F.3d 288, 293 (2d Cir. 
2005) (explaining that routine searches at the border are viewed as reasonable per se 
requiring neither a warrant nor probable cause).   
  Traditionally, the classification of a border search depended on the degree 
of invasion.  In the context of property searches, courts are generally unwilling to find a 
sufficient degree of intrusiveness to raise a search to the level of non-routine, thus 
requiring reasonable suspicion.  See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 
U.S. 579, 592-93 (1983) (holding that boats in inland waters with access to the sea may 
be stopped and boarded without suspicion); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 562 (1976) (holding that vehicles may be stopped at check points near the border 
without any standard of suspicion and such an inspection may be categorized as 
routine); United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.) (affirming the validity 
of a border search that required the cutting open of vehicle’s tire), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 105 (2005); United States v. Myers, 127 F. App’x 251, 252-53 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the drilling of a small hole into a the bed of a truck was not destructive 
and not did it affect the vehicle’s operation; reasonable suspicion was not required).  
 51 A number of circuit courts have held pat-downs to be part of a routine, 
suspicionless border search.  See e.g., Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 203 (3d 
Cir. 2002); United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Gonzalez-Rincon, 36 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 
1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 
1986).  Canine sniffs are also considered routine.  See United States v. Cedano-
Arellano, 332 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 52 Tabbaa v. Chertoff, No. 05-CV-582S, 2005 WL 3531828, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 22, 2005) (stating that fingerprinting and photographing may be part of “a 
minimally invasive routine search” and that “fingerprinting is a tool used by the 
government to discharge its duty of verifying the identity and admissibility of those 
who present themselves for admission to the United States”). 
 53 Independent circumstances which may arouse an agent’s suspicions 
include: excessive nervousness, unusual conduct, traveling to or from a narcotics source 
country, tips from informants, inadequate luggage, loose-fitting clothing, contradictory 
answers, lack of employment, claim of self employment, or airline tickets paid for in 
cash.  See Adams, supra note 18, at 364-65 (exploring the scope of the border search 
doctrine and its value). 
 54 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (holding 
that the disassembly and reassembly of a vehicle’s fuel tank was routine); United 
States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming that the drilling of a 
small hole in the bed of a pick up truck to search for contraband did not require 
reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1803 (2006); United States v. Hernandez, 
424 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming that removal of vehicle door panels with 
screw driver was routine search, reasonable suspicion not required). 
 55 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 & n.4 (holding that the twenty-
seven hour detention of a Colombian national suspected of alimentary canal smuggling 
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Amendment and may be subject to a reasonable suspicion 
standard.56  In Montoya de Hernandez, the Supreme Court 
clarified the distinction between the two types of searches and 
determined that the monitored detention of a Colombian 
national suspected of alimentary canal smuggling required 
only the reasonable suspicion of Customs inspectors.57  
The Court explained that CBP officers must be held to a 
higher standard of suspicion for physically invasive searches 
and those resulting in detention.58  However, the Court also 
emphasized that demanding anything more than reasonable 
suspicion is impracticable.59  Illegal behavior at the border, 
such as internal narcotics smuggling, will rarely produce 
external symptoms.60  Federal violations undetectable by 
outward, physical signs may range from the possession and 
transportation of child pornography61 to evidence of 
participation in a drug trafficking conspiracy.62  Direct evidence 
of such violations may also be concealed in laptop computers or 
  
was appropriate based on the reasonable suspicion of Customs officers).  The Court in 
Montoya de Hernandez provided several examples of searches intrusive enough to be 
characterized as non-routine.  Cf. United States v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842, 845-46 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (explaining that the x-ray examination of luggage and other containers at 
the border is routine and does not require individualized suspicion); United States v. 
Lawson, 374 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (same), aff’d, 461 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 56 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. 
 57 Id.  The Court explained that to hold CBP officials to a higher standard of 
suspicion would be unreasonable.  Id.  The government’s interest in preventing illegal 
narcotics from entering the country is high and such techniques as alimentary canal 
smuggling present no external signs that will enable officials to act on anything more 
than an objective, reasonable suspicion, which is often based on years of experience.  
Id. at 541-42. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 541.  Frisks or strip searches will not uncover alimentary canal 
smuggling and detention to confirm suspicions or dispel them is an option preferable to 
releasing the suspect into the interior with contraband.  Id. at 543-44. 
 60 See, e.g., Blackwood v. State, 581 S.E.2d 724, 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) 
(noting that defendant who had ingested more than one pound of cocaine displayed no 
outward signs of smuggling). 
 61 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2000) makes it unlawful for anyone to  
“knowingly possess[] any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or 
any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, 
or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by 
computer.”  Such offense is punishable by fine, and an offender may be imprisoned for 
a maximum term of twenty years.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b). 
 62 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000) makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally “(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, 
or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance.”  
Persons convicted of conspiracy or attempt of section 841 are “subject to the same 
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of 
the attempt or conspiracy.”  21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). 
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PDAs.  Thus, reasonable suspicion is often the most officers 
will be able to demonstrate; anything else is simply 
unworkable in practice.  Demanding compliance with a higher 
standard of suspicion would allow for widespread evasion of 
federal law.63  In light of the compelling government interests 
in protecting its territorial borders and the inability of Customs 
officials to show probable cause, imposing a higher burden on 
CBP would vitiate the purpose of the border search doctrine.64  
C. The Flores-Montano Approach 
While the routine/non-routine distinction may remain 
important to the validity of physically invasive border searches, 
the Supreme Court has recently rejected the notion that 
“complex balancing tests” be used to characterize Customs 
inspections, at least in the context of vehicles.65  In United 
States v. Flores-Montano, the Court held that the disassembly 
of a vehicle’s gas tank was a routine border search and 
individualized suspicion was not required.66  The decision 
overruled nearly thirty years of case law imposing a reasonable 
suspicion standard on such actions.67  Customs officers had 
stopped a station wagon attempting to enter the United States 
at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry in southern California.68  As 
  
 63 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 543.  
 64 The reasonable suspicion standard fits well within this border search 
context, effectively balancing private interests against the compelling governmental 
interest in stopping smuggling at the border.  Id. at 541-42. 
  Related to non-routine border inspections at the international border or its 
functional equivalent is the extended border search which occurs near the border and is 
constitutionally permissible if the following three-prong test is met: (1) there is a 
reasonable certainty that a border crossing has occurred; (2) there is a reasonable 
certainty that no change in condition of the luggage has occurred since the crossing; 
and (3) there is a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred.  See United 
States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1985).  In United States v. Yang, the 
court held that the search of a defendant at another airport terminal after the 
individual had passed through Customs was lawful under the extended border search 
doctrine, since the three requirements explained above had been met, and officers had 
already discovered a significant amount of drugs on his traveling companion.  286 F.3d 
940, 943, 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2002).  See also United States v. Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F.2d 
526, 531 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1421, 1423 
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding search was valid under the extended border search doctrine 
despite the fact that it occurred several hours and over one-thousand miles from the 
defendant’s border crossing). 
 65 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
 66 Id. at 155. 
 67 Id. at 151 (reversing United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 68 Id. at 150.  “The terms ‘port’ and ‘port of entry’ refer to any place 
designated by Executive Order of the President, by order of the Secretary of the 
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part of a secondary inspection, CBP disassembled the vehicle’s 
fuel tank where officers found more than eighty-one pounds of 
marijuana.69  The Court emphasized that the dignity and 
privacy interests that mandate a certain level of suspicion to 
legitimate the search of one’s person are not implicated in the 
search of a car.70  The Ninth Circuit has affirmed that the 
routine/non-routine characterization is inapplicable to the 
inspection of objects, and is generally an issue only when the 
search is invasive to one’s person.71  Currently, the search of an 
object violates the Fourth Amendment only if the inspection 
was conducted in a “particularly offensive manner.”72  This 
standard permits Customs officials to thoroughly examine and 
even physically alter the object’s composition, so long as the 
search is not unnecessarily destructive.73 
III. COMPUTERS AND DISKETTES ARE SEARCHABLE CARGO 
The Flores-Montano standard distinguishing the search 
of objects from that of people is critical to expand CBP’s 
authority to examine laptop computers and diskettes.  Current 
case law supports the ability of Customs to perform not only a 
superficial search (ensuring the device itself is not a threat) but 
also to conduct a closer inspection during which an agent may 
  
Treasury, or by Act of Congress, at which a Customs officer is authorized to . . . collect 
duties, and to enforce the various provisions of the Customs and navigation laws.”  See 
19 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2006). 
 69 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 150-51.  
 70 Id. at 152.  See also Tabbaa v. Chertoff, No. 05-CV-582S, 2005 WL 
3531828, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005) (explaining that routine, suspicionless 
searches include stops to examine “personal effects”). 
 71 United States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining 
that the Supreme Court in Flores-Montano specifically limited the distinction between 
“routine” and “non-routine” searches to those of one’s person). 
 72 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 n.2 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 
U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977)). 
 73 Id. at 156 (“[W]e conclude that the Government’s authority to conduct 
suspicionless inspections at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, 
and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank.  While it may be true that some searches of 
property as so destructive as to require a different result, this was not one of them.”).  
In Chaudhry, the Ninth Circuit similarly held that the drilling of a 5/16 inch hole in 
the bed of a pickup truck was not destructive enough to characterize the border search 
as non-routine.  424 F.3d at 1053 (citing Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 156).  The court 
did leave open the possibility that a border search of an object might be so destructive 
as to require reasonable suspicion but declined to express an opinion regarding what 
that threshold might be.  Id. at 1054.   
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browse material stored in the computer’s hard drive or view the 
contents of accompanying disks. 74   
In United States v. Irving, a district court denied a 
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence retrieved from 
computer diskettes during a border search; this denial was 
affirmed by the Second Circuit.75  Although the Circuit Court 
declined to address whether or not the search of the diskettes 
was routine, the Court found no error with the district court’s 
determination of the issue.76  In May of 1998, Stefan Irving 
arrived at the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport on a flight from 
Mexico City.77  He was questioned by Customs officials who 
proceeded to inspect his luggage, develop a roll of film, and 
view the contents of several computer diskettes.78  The items 
contained numerous images of child pornography.79  The 
Second Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions under 
federal law,80 as well as the denial of Irving’s motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained during the airport search.81  
The Circuit Court determined that the CBP officers in this 
particular situation were acting under a reasonable suspicion.82 
  
 74 See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d 678, 688 
(S.D. Tex. 2000) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence retrieved from his 
computer during an outbound border search; although in this case defendant consented 
to the search, the inspection of his “computer would have been a routine export search, 
valid under the Fourth Amendment”).  
 75 Irving, 452 F.3d at 122-23. 
 76 Id. at 123-24.  See also United States v. Irving, No. S3 03 CR.0633(LAK), 
2003 WL 22127913, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (explaining that since personal 
computers may be equated with closed containers, “the agents were entitled to inspect 
the contents of the diskettes even absent reasonable suspicion”), reh’g granted, 452 
F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 77 Irving, 452 F.3d at 115. 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id.  Stefan Irving was “a former chief pediatrician for the Middletown, New 
York School district.”  Id. at 114.  His license was revoked after he was convicted of 
attempted sexual abuse in the first degree of a minor.  Id.  Thirteen years later, Irving 
became the target as part of a “nationwide investigation of individuals suspected of 
traveling to Mexico for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts with children.”  Id.  
Irving was stopped when he was traveling home from a visit to the Castillo Vista del 
Mar in Acapulco, Mexico, “a guest house that served as a place where men from the 
United States could have sexual relations with [young] boys.”  Irving, 452 F.3d at 114. 
 80 Id.  Irving was convicted of unlawfully traveling outside of the United 
States for the purpose of engaging in sexual relations with minors in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2423(b) (2000), and receiving and possessing pornographic images of 
children in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B), (a)(5)(B).  Id. 
 81 Id. at 122-23. 
 82 Id. at 124.  Irving was a convicted pedophile; he had traveled to Mexico to 
visit what he called an “orphanage,” and his luggage contained what appeared to be 
children’s drawings.  Id. 
772 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
However, the significant portion of the opinion is that which 
fails to find error with the trial court’s affirmation that the 
defendant’s computer could be searched without suspicion.83  
The district court equated the device with an ordinary closed 
container or a locked piece of luggage for inspection purposes—
the inspection of which “is the paradigmatic routine border 
search.”84   
The Fourth Circuit has explicitly affirmed CBP 
authority to inspect personal computers and view the contents 
of accompanying diskettes in United States v. Ickes.85  
Defendant John Ickes was stopped at the United States-
Canada border for a routine inspection when Customs officials 
discovered drug paraphernalia and a photo album containing 
pornographic images of children.86  CBP officers proceeded to 
examine Ickes’s personal laptop computer as well as 
approximately seventy-five diskettes, all of which contained 
child pornography.87  While the officers in this particular 
instance were operating under a reasonable suspicion triggered 
by the photo-album,88 the court reiterated Customs’ ability to 
search personal computers without such suspicion and 
emphasized the broad, statutory language from which CBP 
derives much of its authority.89  Specifically, the court noted the 
  
 83 Id.  
 84 See United States v. Irving, No. S3 03 CR.0633(LAK), 2003 WL 22127913, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d 678, 
689 (S.D. Tex. 2000)). 
  The trial court in Irving cited several cases supporting the “compar[ison of] 
personal notebook computers to closed containers for the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”  Id.  See also, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 458 
(5th Cir. 2001) (assuming that computer disks are containers and that standards 
governing closed container searches apply); United States v. Al-Marri, 203 F. Supp. 2d 
535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Courts have uniformly agreed that computers should be 
treated as if they were closed containers.”); United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 
936 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that “the Fourth Amendment protection of closed 
computer files and hard drives is similar to the protection it affords a person’s closed 
containers and closed personal effects”). 
  The Irving court concluded that the “agents were entitled to inspect the 
contents of the diskettes even absent reasonable suspicion. . . . [A]ny other decision 
effectively would allow individuals to render graphic contraband . . . largely immune to 
border search simply by scanning images onto a computer disk before arriving at the 
border.”  Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *5.  
 85 393 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 86 Id. at 502-03. 
 87 Id. at 503. 
 88 “[Ickes] told a U.S. Customs Inspector that he was returning from 
vacation.  The inspector, however, was puzzled . . . because Ickes’s van appeared to 
contain ‘everything he owned.’”  Id. at 502. 
 89 Id. at 503-04 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000)). 
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embracive term “cargo”90 and the repeated use of “any.”91  A 
reading of the plain language combined with the historical 
pedigree of the government’s plenary power at the border 
negated any statutory interpretation that would exclude 
electronic devices from the scope of Customs authority.92  In 
denying Ickes’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
during the search, the court flatly rejected the argument that 
computers and computer disks are excluded from the 
contemplated reach of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a).93  Congress clearly 
intended broad application of the statute and did not need to 
explicitly include electronic equipment.94  
Perhaps even more importantly, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the personal, expressive nature of information 
capable of storage on a computer or disk is irrelevant to CBP’s 
search authority.95  The court noted the “staggering” 
ramifications for national security that would result from an 
exemption for electronic information, that such logic would 
create a sanctuary for terrorist plans which are inherently 
expressive.96  Officers would also be faced with the impossible 
task of distinguishing personal files from non-expressive 
material, creating costly, time consuming legal dilemmas not 
meant to occur during a border search.97  Creating an exception 
at the border for computer files would undermine the very 
  
 90 “Cargo” means “goods transported by a vessel, airplane, or vehicle.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 2004). 
 91 See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 504.  The U.S.C. provides that: 
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or 
vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as 
he may be authorized, within a customs-enforcement area . . . , or at any 
other authorized place . . . and examine . . . documents and papers and 
examine, inspect, and search . . . every part thereof and any person, trunk, 
package, or cargo on board . . . . 
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000) (emphasis added).  The language of the present statute is 
virtually identical to that of the customs statute passed by the first congress.  See 
supra note 41. 
 92 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 504-06.  The court also relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004), as an indication that 
border search authority should be as broad as possible within constitutional bounds.  
Ickes, 383 F.3d at 505. 
 93 Ickes, 383 F.3d at 504. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 506. 
 96 Id.  See also United States v. Irving, No. S3 03 CR.0633(LAK), 2003 WL 
22127913, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003).  
 97 Ickes, 383 F.3d at 506.  
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foundation of the border search doctrine and negate its 
effectiveness.98 
The notion that a laptop computer is the equivalent of a 
closed-container for Fourth Amendment purposes would seem 
equally applicable to hand-held electronic devices and PDAs.  
PDAs and other hand-held wireless communication devices are 
nearly identical to laptops in both function and storage 
capacity.99  Applying the Flores-Montano methodology to these 
objects, CBP clearly has the authority to examine the contents 
of such electronic “cargo” during a border inspection, regardless 
of the presence of an independent trigger providing reasonable 
suspicion.100  Thus, according to present case law, the logical 
conclusion appears to be that CBP has authority to search a 
traveler’s iPod, BlackBerry, Palm Pilot, or flash drive without 
reasonable suspicion.  
IV. THE AUTHORITY TO PHOTOCOPY PAPER MATERIALS AT 
THE BORDER 
Directly associated with CBP’s authority to search all 
cargo crossing the border101 is the government’s ability to 
photocopy or reproduce material found during inspection.102  
Material replicated during a border search often proves to be 
critical evidence in a later criminal prosecution.103  The 
authority to copy paper materials has been uniformly upheld 
since the 1985 Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. 
Fortna.104  In Fortna, the court established that the 
photocopying of papers tending to prove the defendant’s 
participation in a drug trafficking conspiracy was 
constitutionally valid.105  Fortna’s progeny have continued to 
affirm the validity of this holding, demonstrated as recently as 
2001 in the successful prosecution of one of Osama bin Laden’s 
  
 98 Id. 
 99 See infra Part V.A. 
 100 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000). 
 101 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2000). 
 102 See, e.g., United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738-39 (5th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 159 F.3d 1349 
(2d Cir. 1998); State v. Codner, 696 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 103 United States v. Schoor, 597 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir.1979) (“[C]ustoms 
officials were themselves entitled to seize . . . documents, . . . having been notified that 
[the documents] were the instrumentalities of a crime involving the illegal importation 
of [narcotics].”). 
 104 796 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 105 Id. at 738-39. 
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top aides.106  Additionally, this authority has been held 
applicable to outbound packages not carried on one’s person 
while traveling.107  However, limitations on the ability to copy 
paper material have also been established.108  Ultimately, 
Fortna and its progeny must be read in light of the recent 
circuit court decisions in Irving and Ickes.  CBP must be 
allowed to not only search electronic devices but also to copy 
electronic material stored therein, subjecting only the 
reproduction of digital evidence to a reasonable suspicion 
standard.  
A. United States v. Fortna  
In Fortna, the Fifth Circuit held, inter alia, that 
Customs officers may photocopy what they believe to be 
incriminating evidence during a validly executed border 
inspection.109  On April 15, 1985, George Sharer arrived at the 
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport on a flight from 
Mexico City.110  Customs officials found several documents of 
interest in his carry-on luggage which they proceeded to read 
closely and photocopy.111  These documents included a map of 
northern Mexico indicating airstrip locations, two airline 
tickets to Bogotá, Colombia, and a note that read “‘Pick up pilot 
in Miami.’”112  Sharer and three other men were later convicted 
of conspiracy to import cocaine.113  The Fifth Circuit denied 
Sharer’s motion to suppress the evidence photocopied during 
the airport inspection.114  The court first stated that “[t]he 
search [of] Sharer’s personal belongings . . . was clearly 
justified because he was crossing [the United States] border.”115  
The court further explained that since Sharer could have no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in this context, he could not 
reasonably believe that his documents could be shielded from 
  
 106 See discussion supra Part I. 
 107 See United States v. Seljan, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1078-81 (C.D. Cal. 
2004). 
 108 See, e.g., People v. LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d 394, 396 (App. Div. 1994). 
 109 Fortna, 796 F.2d at 738-39. 
 110 Id. at 738. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id.  The originals were promptly returned to the travelers.  Id. 
 113 Id. at 727. 
 114 Id. at 739. 
 115 Fortna, 796 F.2d at 738. 
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customs officials during inspection.116  Nothing more was 
needed to justify the photocopying of the materials.117  The 
reproduction of the evidence “merely memorialized the agents’ 
observations and provided a means to verify any subsequent 
recounting of them.”118  The Fifth Circuit concluded that as long 
as the initial inspection is valid and the photocopying is done in 
“good faith” and to further a “legitimate governmental 
purpose[],” no constitutional rights are violated.119 
The authority to copy paper at the border has been 
consistently upheld.120  In United States v. Soto-Teran, the 
Eastern District Court of New York adhered to the holding of 
Fortna and rejected a claim that the reproduction of a personal 
letter by Customs violated the privacy rights of both the letter’s 
carrier and the addressee.121  Defendant Nelson Soto-Teran was 
stopped by the Customs Service for a routine inspection after 
he arrived at the Miami International Airport on a flight from 
Cali, Colombia.122  During questioning, Soto appeared nervous; 
his “hands were shaking, sweat appeared on his brow, and he 
would not make eye contact.”123  Officers proceeded to take Soto 
to a secondary inspection area where they found a sealed letter 
in his briefcase, which they carefully read and photocopied.124  
After returning the letter, the officers searched Soto’s wallet 
and telephone book, copying various pieces of paper indicating 
involvement in narcotics smuggling.125  Less than one month 
later, Soto was arrested and indicted on substantive charges 
relating to the mass importation and distribution of cocaine.126  
  
 116 Id. 
 117 See id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 738-39. 
 120 See United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023, 2001 WL 30061, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001) (“The mere fact that the Government photocopied the 
Defendant’s papers does not make the search unreasonable in scope.”).  See also United 
States v. Ramos, Nos. 93-50416, 93-50531, 93-50546 and 93-50559, 1995 WL 89427, at 
*1 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 1995) (denying motion to suppress photocopy of defendant’s date 
book in prosecution for conspiracy to traffic cocaine; search was valid and nothing 
unreasonable about the copying); State v. Codner, 696 So. 2d 806, 810-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1997) (holding photocopying of contents of defendant’s wallet reasonable during 
valid, routine border search). 
 121 United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), 
aff’d, 159 F.3d 1349 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 122 Id. at 188. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 188-89. 
 125 Id. at 189. 
 126 Id. at 187, 189. 
2007] BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE 777 
His motion to suppress the photocopied evidence obtained 
during the border search was denied.127  The court described the 
“unlimited discretion” of customs officials to search packages 
and the necessarily broad authority to inspect locked luggage 
and personal belongings.128  The court concluded that a 
reasonable suspicion standard129 should apply when CBP 
officers photocopy personal documents.130  In rejecting the 
argument of the letter’s addressee that her First Amendment 
rights were violated, the court emphasized the fact that neither 
a letter’s carrier nor addressee may legitimately expect privacy 
at the border.131  Based on the holdings of Fortna and Soto-
Teran, the photocopying of materials during a border search is 
clearly permissible and requires nothing more than reasonable 
suspicion.  This authority violates neither the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections nor the privacy interests of travelers. 
CBP officers’ ability to inspect and photocopy personal 
documents also applies to material entering and exiting the 
country via commercial carriers.132  In United States v. Seljan, a 
district court denied a motion to suppress evidence copied 
during the search of three outbound FedEx packages at the 
international border’s functional equivalent.133  In Seljan, the 
defendant was suspected of using an interstate facility to entice 
a minor by sending sexually explicit material to an eight year 
old girl in the Philippines.134  First, the district court 
determined that the officers were acting under statutory 
authority to interdict the export of unreported currency when 
they opened the first FedEx package.135  Upon opening the first 
package and discovering evidence indicating the defendant’s 
sexual involvement with a child, the officers were acting under 
  
 127 Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 187 (citations omitted).  
 128 Id. at 190-91. 
 129 Factors giving rise to reasonable suspicion included the suspect’s excessive 
nervousness and origination of flight from Colombia, a known source country for drugs.  
Id. at 188.  See also United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing 
“whether the suspect’s flight originated at a known source of drugs” as influencing the 
possibility of reasonable suspicion). 
 130 Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 1991. 
 131 Id. at 192-93.  The valid inspection did not “chill[]” addressee’s First 
Amendment rights.  Id. at 193.  “[T]he Supreme Court [has] implicitly approved border 
searches of articles [and] containers.”  Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 
606, 623 (1977)). 
 132 See, e.g., United States v. Seljan, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2004).  
 133 Id. at 1086.  
 134 Id. at 1084.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2000) (prohibiting the use of an 
interstate facility to entice a minor). 
 135 Seljan, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2000)).  
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reasonable suspicion when they opened the following two 
packages and photocopied their contents.136  The court 
concluded that CBP officials properly acted in furtherance of a 
legitimate government purpose: the preservation of evidence.137  
B. Limits on the Scope of Fortna 
The ability to photocopy or reproduce information found 
during a border search is not absolute.  This authority is 
subject to several limitations regarding the scope of CBP law 
enforcement as well as the ability to retain and disseminate 
personal information.138  While CBP is responsible for the 
collection of duties,139 the Agency must also enforce over four 
hundred laws on behalf of forty federal agencies—namely 
restrictions designed to protect Americans from dangerous and 
illegal goods.140  Despite this immense responsibility, CBP 
officers are nonetheless restricted and do not possess the 
general investigative or enforcement authority of state police.141  
In People v. LePera, a New York court emphasized this point by 
suppressing photocopied gambling records obtained during a 
search at the United States-Canada border.142  The court 
clarified that while the search of the defendant’s vehicle and 
subsequent photocopying of his papers would be valid if officers 
suspected a violation of federal gambling laws,143 the same 
could not hold true for the commission of an offense defined 
only in the New York Penal Code.144  The court emphasized that 
  
 136 Id. at 1084.  In the first of the three Federal Express packages searched by 
Customs, letters were found in which defendant requested pictures of the girl.  Id.  
Officers has reason to suspect that defendant was violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and 
therefore, the search of the other two packages was proper.  Id.  
 137 Id. at 1085.  Cf. United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 629-30 (9th Cir. 
1985) (holding that Customs official could present evidence regarding his observations, 
but the photocopies obtained during inspection must be suppressed, since the contents 
of the FedEx package were not subject to seizure). 
 138 See generally Heidy v. U.S. Customs Serv., 681 F. Supp. 1445 (C.D. Cal. 
1988); People v. LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d 394 (App. Div. 1994).  
 139 CBP collects more than $81 million dollars in revenue each day.  See CPB, 
A Day in the Life of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, http://www.cbp.gov/ 
xp/cgov/toolbox/about/accomplish/day.xml [hereinafter CPB, A Day in the Life] (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2006). 
 140 See CBP, CBP Cargo Examinations, http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/ 
port_activities/cargo_exmainations.xml (last visited Sept. 13, 2006). 
 141 LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 397. 
 142 Id. at 397-98.  New York State makes the possession of gambling records a 
crime.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.20 (McKinney 2000). 
 143 See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000) (prohibiting illegal gambling businesses). 
 144 LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 397-98. 
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federal regulations explicitly limit CBP by confining property 
seizures to situations in which a “Customs officer . . . believe[s] 
that any law or regulation enforced by the Customs Service has 
been violated.”145 
Additionally, courts have limited the Bureau’s ability to 
retain and share photocopied evidence with other law 
enforcement agencies.146  In Heidy v. United States Customs 
Service, a district court in California announced that a 
Customs practice of keeping photocopied evidence and records 
of non-violation of federal law was constitutionally 
impermissible.147  The plaintiffs in Heidy were United States 
citizens re-entering the country from Nicaragua.148  During 
inspection, Customs officials searched and photocopied all 
papers carried by the individuals to ensure that the travelers 
were not importing seditious material.149  With the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) assistance, Customs made 
permanent records consisting of the identity of each person 
from whom material was seized and a final determination 
regarding the legality of the documents.150  Although the 
written material was found not to violate federal law, the 
copies and records were nonetheless retained by both Customs 
and the FBI.151  The individuals feared that government’s 
possession of these records would subject them to future 
inquiries upon reentry.152  The court acknowledged Customs 
authority to review and copy written material during a border 
search, but ordered the destruction of records of non-
violation.153  Specifically, the Service was to: (1) return any 
originals to the owner, (2) destroy all copies and records 
reflecting individual identity, and (3) refuse dissemination to 
any federal agency not willing to comply with Customs 
policies.154  
  
 145 Id. at 397 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 162.21(a) (2006)). 
 146 See Heidy v. U.S. Customs Serv., 681 F. Supp. 1445, 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1988).  
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 1446. 
 149 Id. at 1446-47.  CBP is charged with enforcing the law prohibiting persons 
from “importing into the United States from any foreign country any book, pamphlet, 
paper, [or] writing . . . containing any matter advocating or urging treason or 
insurrection against the United States or forcible resistance to any law of the United 
States.”  19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2000). 
 150 Heidy, 681 F. Supp. at 1446-47. 
 151 Id. at 1447. 
 152 Id. at 1448.  
 153 Id. at 1448, 1453. 
 154 Id. at 1453. 
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While CBP maintains broad authority under the border 
search doctrine to examine and photocopy materials found 
during inspection, this authority is limited.  The limits 
regarding Customs enforcement power and the retention of 
copied evidence are adequate protections for those traveling 
across the United States border with paper documents.  These 
protections are equally effective in the digital context.  Thus, 
CBP must be able to reproduce electronic information under 
the same principles established in Fortna and Soto-Teran. 
C. Reproduction of Digital Information under the Fortna 
Principle 
The authority established by Fortna and its progeny to 
copy written materials during a border inspection may logically 
be applied to digitally stored information as well.  The 
authority to browse the contents of a traveler’s PDA or laptop 
would be useless if CBP were unable to obtain a hard copy of 
incriminating files found therein.  The ability to view but not to 
duplicate electronically stored files would allow travelers to 
delete material implicating involvement in a federal criminal 
offense during or moments after a search.   
First, the Fourth Amendment’s protections are 
inapplicable in the border search context.155  Second, one must 
apply the new Flores-Montano method, since computers and 
hand-held electronic devices are inanimate objects, thus 
making the routine/non-routine distinction irrelevant.156  CBP 
may examine these items as it would any other form of cargo, 
without reasonable suspicion.  Finally, since there is no 
constitutional impediment to photocopying paper material 
examined during a search, the Fortna authority to reproduce 
evidence must be applied to electronic information as well.  The 
reproduction of all digitally stored information must be 
permitted when reasonable suspicion is present.  While the 
medium has changed, the logic has not.  Electronically stored 
documents should receive no more protection than material in 
the analog world. 
  
 155 See supra Part II.A. 
 156 See supra Part II.C. 
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V. THE NEED TO APPLY FORTNA TO DIGITAL INFORMATION 
The application of the border search exception and the 
principle of Fortna to electronic devices and the digital 
information contained therein is vital to the protection of our 
nation and the integrity of our border.  Customs officials must 
be able to search all laptops and PDAs that enter the U.S. and 
reproduce information contained therein, memorializing their 
observations should subsequent verification of them prove 
necessary in a criminal prosecution.157  Portable electronic 
devices, laptop computers, and disks are unique in both the 
quantity and nature of personal information these objects may 
contain.  However, one may not reasonably entertain an 
expectation of privacy while crossing the international 
border.158  While travelers may disapprove of the government’s 
authority to browse vast amounts of personal communications 
and emails, the consequences of creating an exemption for such 
material far outweigh individual privacy concerns.  Creating a 
sanctuary at the border for digital information would cripple 
Customs in the fight against terrorism, narcotics trafficking, 
illegal money transfers, and child pornographers.  Existing 
protections and the adoption of a new CBP policy providing for 
the destruction of copied materials are adequate safeguards. 
A. The Unique Obstacle Presented by Digital Information 
We are in the midst of an information revolution . . . . Digital 
technology enables the preservation of the minutia of our everyday 
comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of who we are and 
what we own . . . small details . . . are now preserved forever in the 
digital minds of computers.159  
Laptop computers, PDAs, flash drives, and myriad other 
hand-held devices that have proliferated in recent years 
present a unique security obstacle for CBP as well as privacy 
concerns for the international traveler.  The mobile electronics 
market has grown dramatically in the last decade and the 
storage capacity of these machines presents issues not 
previously encountered in the border search context.  Typically, 
the amount of personal belongings and paper documents an 
individual may carry while traveling is limited by both space 
  
 157 See United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 158 See supra Part V.B.  
 159 DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 1 (2004). 
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and weight considerations.160  However, computer hard drives 
and PDAs present their owners with the opportunity to carry 
more information in their carry-on luggage than one might 
contemplate transporting in analog form.  For example, 
computer hard drives sold in 2005 have a storage capacity of 
around eighty gigabytes.161  This is “roughly equivalent to forty 
million pages of text - about the amount of information 
contained in the books on one floor of a typical academic 
library.”162  As computers become smaller, lighter, and 
generally more compact, travelers may be able to carry nearly 
sixty gigabytes of hard drive space on a machine weighing less 
than three pounds.163  In addition, USB flash drives, the 
modern equivalent of floppy disks, are typically no larger than 
a stick of gum and may contain up to two gigabytes of storage, 
maintaining data for nearly ten years.164 
While PDAs are not equipped with the same vast 
amount of storage space, they come close.  The BlackBerry,165 
one of the most popular wireless communication devices on the 
market, comes equipped with anywhere from sixteen to sixty-
four megabytes of storage depending on the model.166  Assuming 
  
 160 Generally, travelers are limited to two pieces of luggage which must be 
checked and can weigh anywhere from fifty to seventy pounds depending on class and 
the destination of the flight; one carry-on item is typically allowed but is not to exceed 
forty pounds in weight.  See American Airlines, Baggage Allowance, 
http://www.aa.com/content/travelInformation/baggage/baggageAllowance.jhtml (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2006); Delta Skyteam, Baggage Allowance on Flights, 
http://www.delta.com/traveling_checkin/baggage/baggage_allowance/index.jsp (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2006); US Airways, Baggage Policies, http://www.usairways.com/awa/ 
content/traveltools/baggage/baggagepolicies.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2006). 
 161 A gigabyte is “[a] unit of information equal to one billion . . . bytes or one 
thousand megabytes.”  Webster’s Online Dictionary, Gigabyte, http://www.websters-
online-dictionary.org/definition/gigabyte (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).  A byte holds the 
equivalent of a single character, such as a letter, dollar sign, or decimal point.  
Webster’s Online Dictionary, Byte, http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/ 
definition/byte (last visited Aug. 28, 2006). 
 162 See Kerr, supra note 30, at 542.  The amount of storage space available on 
computer hard drives “tend[s] to double about every two years.”  Id.   
 163 The Sony VAIO TX series offers models with such storage capacity and 
weight.  Sony, http://www.sonystyle.com (follow “Computers: Notebooks” hyperlink; 
then follow “TX Series” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 28, 2006).  
 164 USB Flash Drive Alliance, USB Flash Drive Overview, 
http://www.usbflashdrive.org/usbfd_overview.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2006). 
 165 The BlackBerry is manufactured by Canadian company Research in 
Motion.  See Research in Motion Homepage, http://www.rim.com (last visited Sept. 13, 
2006). 
 166 For example, the 7280 model contains sixteen megabytes of memory while 
the new Pearl 8100 model contains sixty-four and accepts micoSD cards that are 
capable of expanding that capacity.  See BlackBerry, 
http://www.discoverblackberry.com/devices/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2006). 
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all of that space was used for text communications, a sixty-
four-megabyte BlackBerry would theoretically permit a 
traveler to carry the equivalent of 32,000 pages of text, sixty-
four thick books, or over 60,000 emails in their purse or coat 
pocket.167  These machines generally include a personal 
organizer containing an address book, calendar, memo pad, and 
task list, as well as Yahoo! Instant Messenger.168  Apple 
Computer’s ubiquitous iPod is also growing in terms of memory 
and storage capacity.169  Software enhancements make the 
digital music player more akin to a PDA since the device may 
also be used as an external hard drive for the backup and 
transportation of files.170  As of September 2006, the most 
recent version of the iPod can accommodate videos, 25,000 
personal photos, and contains a calendar and address book.171  
In addition to information intentionally downloaded or entered 
onto the device by the user, many operating systems and 
programs store information about how and when the device has 
been used, including information about the user’s interest, 
habits, and online activity—all of this unknown to the user 
himself.172  
Clearly the international traveler of the twenty-first 
century has the ability to carry a warehouse of personal 
information in a comparatively miniscule amount of space.173  
This, however, is not reason to restrict CBP’s authority but 
  
 167 One megabyte is equal to 1,024 kilobytes.  One kilobyte is equivalent to 
one half page of text, the size of an average email without an attachment.  See 
wiseGEEK, How Much Text is in a Kilobyte or Megabyte?, http://www.wisegeek.com/ 
how-much-text-is-in-a-kilobyte-or-megabyte.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2006). 
 168 See BlackBerry, BlackBerry Desktop Software, http://www.blackberry.com/ 
products/software/desktop/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 31, 2006).  Hewlett Packard’s 
popular iPAQ offers similar features and storage space.  See Hewlett Packard, 
Introduction to Handheld PC’s, http://h71036.www7.hp.com/ hho/cache/9044-0-0-225-
121.aspx (last visited Jul. 31, 2006). 
 169 See Apple, iPod, http://www.apple.com/ipod/ipod.html (last visited Sept. 1, 
2006). 
 170 David Pogue, State of the Art; Online Piper, Payable by the Tune, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2003, at G1. 
 171 See Apple, iPod, http://www.apple.com/ipod/ipod.html (last visited Sept. 1, 
2006). 
 172 Kerr, supra note 30, at 542-43.  Word processing programs such as 
Microsoft Word create “temporary files that permit analysts to reconstruct the 
development of a file,” while internet browsers create a cache of web pages visited so 
that both the user’s browsing history and the actual search terms entered into an 
engine, such as Google, may be retrieved.  Id. at 543.  
 173 A BlackBerry weighs less than five ounces.  BlackBerry, Compare Devices, 
http://www.blackberry.com/compare/compare.do?handhelds=81&handhelds=202&hand
helds=242&handhelds=243&handhelds=101&method=getFeatureView&x=51&y=14 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2006). 
784 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
reason to expand it.  The storage capabilities of electronic 
devices and the vast quantity of information such machines 
may contain demand this result.174  The advent of new 
technology and the increased digitalization of personal 
information presents CBP with a unique obstacle in the 
inspection and reproduction of potentially valuable evidence.  
Admittedly, the amount of information that may be stored on 
these devices is a legitimate concern for travelers and merits a 
consideration the role of the Fourth Amendment, its protection 
of a person’s “papers,” and implicit constitutional protections of 
information privacy.175  However, the following sections will 
demonstrate that the absence of reasonable expectations of 
privacy at the border combined with the practical consequences 
of allowing such an exemption for electronic data demand the 
application of Fortna to current technology.  The preservation 
of electronic evidence is necessary for the efficient protection of 
our borders and the enforcement of federal law.  Existing 
protections established under Fortna and its progeny combined 
with a policy of non-retention and non-dissemination is enough 
to preserve the interests of those crossing the border.  
B. Information Privacy Concerns are Inapplicable at the 
Border 
Although absent from the text of the Constitution and 
lacking a uniform definition, privacy may be interpreted as the 
control over information about ourselves and its 
communication to others.176  In Griswold v. Connecticut, the 
Supreme Court identified an implicit constitutional right to 
privacy.177  The Court invalidated a Connecticut law banning 
the use of contraceptives and identified zones in which the 
confidential relationships of citizens are protected from 
governmental intrusion.178  Later, this definition was expanded 
to encompass information privacy as well.179  The Supreme 
  
 174 See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 175 See Adams, supra note 18, at 371.  
 176 See Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, in DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC 
ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 28, 28 (2003).  
 177 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 178 Id. at 485.  See also SOLOVE, supra note 159, at 64.  
 179 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (upholding New York state law 
requiring records to be kept of prescriptions involving addictive substances but 
identifying information privacy as a constitutionally protected).  See also SOLOVE, 
supra note 159, at 65.  
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Court identified “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure 
of personal matters” as constitutionally protected.180  It is this 
interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal information that 
is implicated in the border search of electronic devices and the 
reproduction of digital information.181 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to 
protect personal information from disclosure; however, the 
expectation of that privacy is neither reasonable nor applicable 
at the border.182  In his concurring opinion in Katz v. United 
States, Justice Harlan explained the notion of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and set forth a two-part inquiry to guide 
Fourth Amendment analyses for determining the validity of a 
search.183  The first question is whether the individual 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of 
the challenged search.184  The second inquiry is whether society 
is willing to recognize that privacy expectation as reasonable.185  
While it remains true that the Fourth Amendment protects 
people and not places, the amount of privacy afforded and that 
which may reasonably be expected inevitably depends on 
place.186  While privacy expectations at home are correctly at 
their highest, the same does not hold true at the border, where 
one may not reasonably expect to be free from unwarranted 
searches and seizures.187  Thus to be protected under the two-
  
 180 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600 (footnote omitted).   
 181 Information privacy seems to be “implicit in the Fourth Amendment’s 
[specific] protection of personal ‘papers.’”  Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in 
the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 288 (2003).  
 182 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004) (discussing 
lack of expectation of privacy of property at United States border); United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 623 n.17 (1977) (same). 
 183 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  See also 1 JOHN WESLEY 
HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 58-59 (3d ed. 2000).  
 184 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).   
 185 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).   
 186 Id. at 351; see also INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 176, at 585. 
 187 For cases upholding the highest expectation of privacy in the home, see 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that although “the States retain 
broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere 
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home”); Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands 
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.”). 
  For cases illustrating the lowered expectations at the border, see United 
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985); Carroll v. United States 267 
U.S. 132, 134-35 (1925) (upholding constitutionality of search and seizure of 
defendant’s vehicle; affirming conviction for violation of the National Prohibition Act).  
“Customs officers are granted power by Congress to search persons and 
property . . . . [This authority] may be said to be a right which the Government 
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pronged Katz test, an individual must (1) “exhibit an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy” in his or her laptop or PDA,  
and (2) “that expectation [must] be one that society is prepared 
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”188  In the context of the United 
States border, the inquiry fails.  “[A] port of entry is not a 
traveler’s home;” expectations of privacy are significantly 
lessened when balanced with the government’s compelling 
interests at the border.189  
Privacy is in constant tension with security interests 
and law enforcement’s ability to prevent criminal activity.190  
However, “[t]he . . . line between an [impermissible] search . . . 
and an appropriate law enforcement practice [clearly depends 
on] a person[’s] . . . reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
object of the search.”191  The compelling security interests in the 
border context far outweigh the information privacy interests a 
traveler may reasonably expect to have,192 especially in the 
context of personal objects.193  Privacy expectations for the 
information contained in electronic devices are simply 
unreasonable and the consequences of such immunity would be 
enormous. 
C. Consequences of an Exemption for Electronic Devices  
Establishing immunity for digital information at the 
border would result in a federal agency unable to adapt to 
modern methods of criminal evasion, thus rendering the 
enforcement powers of CBP meaningless.  Such an exception 
would prevent the effective policing of our borders with the 
most striking consequences evident in the battle against terror, 
drugs, the illegal flow of money, and the protection of minors 
from sexual exploitation. 
  
exercises over individuals in exchange for the privilege of entering the territory of the 
United States.”  Id. 
 188 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); HALL, supra note 183, at 58-
59.  
 189 United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) 
(explaining that one’s “right to be let alone” prevents neither the search of luggage nor 
the seizure of illegal materials when possession of them is discovered during such a 
search). 
 190 INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 176, at 275.  
 191 See 2 HALL, supra note 183, at 426 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 192 See discussion supra Part II. 
 193 See generally United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).  
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As the Fourth Circuit emphasizes in United States v. 
Ickes, the national security ramifications of an exemption for 
digital information would be “staggering.”194  Efforts to prevent 
another terrorist attack on United States soil have been 
dubbed the War on Terror.195  This offensive has been launched 
against an elusive, amorphous target with a scale of activity 
unlike anything previously seen.196  The fight against terrorism 
at the border proves to be one of the government’s toughest 
obstacles.  For example, CBP seizing over ninety percent of 
contraband in the form of controlled substances or child 
pornography would be considered an unparalleled law 
enforcement success.197  The same line of thinking does not 
apply in the context of terrorism.198  Allowing less than “10 
percent of terrorists or materials for major terrorist acts” 
across the border could result in a catastrophic national 
disaster.199  Customs must not only prevent the physical entry 
of lethal toxins and infectious agents but also intercept 
terrorist communications and uncover plans and conspiracies 
prior to an attack.200  Immunity for electronically stored 
information from search and replication would create an 
enormous loophole for individuals planning an attack on U.S. 
nationals. 
The assumption that al Qaeda does not use e-mail has 
been deemed erroneous by the FBI.201  The fact has been 
established that terrorists use information technology for a 
variety of purposes, including the planning of attacks, fund 
raising, communication, and the dissemination of 
propaganda.202  As the rest of the world has turned to laptops 
and wireless communication devices for the storage of personal 
information, it appears terrorists have as well.  During the 
  
 194 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 195 Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Lessons of the “War” on Drugs for the “War” on 
Terrorism, in COUNTERING TERRORISM 73, 73 (Arnold M. Howitt & Robyn L. Pangi eds., 
2003). 
 196 Id. at 73-74. 
 197 Id. at 83-84. 
 198 Id.  
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 75, 83. 
 201 Elsa Walsh, Learning to Spy; Can Maureen Baginski Save the F.B.I.?, THE 
NEW YORKER, Nov. 8, 2004, at 96. 
 202 Michael A. Vatis, Cyber Attacks: Protecting America’s Security Against 
Digital Threats, in COUNTERING TERRORISM, supra note 195, at 219, 229 (citing 
Testimony of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, Before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, May 10, 2001, http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/freeh051001.htm). 
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investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New 
York, officials found detailed plans to destroy U.S. bound 
airliners in encrypted files on the suicide bomber’s laptop.203  In 
2004, a raid on a home in Pakistan uncovered a “‘treasure 
trove’ of information” contained on laptop computers and disks 
indicating al Qaeda’s resolve to commit more attacks on United 
States soil.204  As the court in Ickes reminds us—this type of 
material is inherently personal and expressive. 205  However, 
creating a sanctuary for such communications because of 
privacy concerns would undermine the compelling reasons that 
lie at the heart of the border search doctrine.206  Failure to 
apply the border search doctrine and the Fortna holding to the 
digital medium would cripple “America’s frontline”207  in the 
war on terror.  
The impact would be equally enormous on America’s 
other prominent battle, the War on Drugs.208  The seizure of 
controlled substances accounts for a large portion of CBP 
activity.209  The ability of Customs to effectively counter the 
inbound flow of narcotics depends on the government’s 
authority to search not only for physical contraband but for 
  
 203 Id. 
 204 Al-Qaeda in America: The Terror Plot, TIME, Aug. 16, 2004, at 28.  On July 
24, 2004, a raid on the Pakistani home of an al Qaeda leader “uncovered three 
laptop[s] . . . and 51 . . . discs” containing “500 photographs of potential targets inside 
the U.S., . . . detailed analyses of the vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack of several of 
them and communications among some of the most wanted terrorists in the 
world. . . . [T]he surveillance data on the hard drives [was] at least three years old.”  Id.  
 205 See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 206 Id.  
 207 CBP, CBP Mission Statement and Core Values, http://customs.gov/xp/ 
cgov/toolbox/about/mission/guardians.xml (last visited Sept. 14, 2006). 
 208 Laurie L. Levenson, Border Searches, 26 NAT’L L.J. 7, 8 (2004).  It is illegal 
“to import to or export from the United States any controlled substance or narcotic 
drug listed in schedules I through V of the Controlled Substances Act . . . .” 19 C.F.R. 
§ 162.61 (2006).  Controlled substances prohibited by Schedules I through V include: 
cocaine, heroin and other opiate derivatives, marijuana, methamphetamine, morphine, 
and peyote.  21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2000).  
  In the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon declared a war on drugs and 
called for an aggressive attack on the country’s “public enemy number one.”  STEVEN 
WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 3 (1986) (citing EDWARD J. 
EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR 178 (1977)).  Nixon created the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) and greatly expanded the federal government’s involvement in 
the effort to disrupt the importation of controlled substances across our border.  Id. at 
249-51. 
 209 During the 2005 federal fiscal year, Customs “officers seized over 127 tons 
of narcotics at Southern California ports of entry alone.”  News Release, CBP, CBP 
Sees Increase in Drug and Migrant Interceptions in California (Jan. 24, 2006) 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/012006/01242006.xml (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2006). 
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evidence of trafficking conspiracies as well.210  Fortna provides 
a classic example of the type of evidence that must be obtained 
and reproduced for use in criminal prosecutions.211  As 
terrorists have turned to computer storage, there is no reason 
to believe that narco-traffickers would not do the same.  
Uploading maps, travel itineraries, and personal 
communications to a BlackBerry would be far safer and more 
efficient than carrying the same information in the bulkier, 
more readily searchable paper form.212  Digital information is 
also easier to delete moments before a Customs inspection.  
Under Ickes and Irving, CBP would be able to view this 
information but not reproduce it.  Fortna must be extended to 
resolve this problem.  Officers must be permitted to 
memorialize their observations and provide a means to verify a 
subsequent recounting of them, thus preventing traffickers 
from destroying incriminating evidence with the push of a 
button.213  Exempting electronic data from replication or, 
alternatively, requiring a higher standard of suspicion for 
reproduction, would prevent Customs from obtaining evidence 
needed to convict those trafficking in deadly narcotics for 
personal profit.214 
Immunity from search and reproduction for electronic 
information would also prevent CBP from stemming the illegal 
cross-border transfer of money used to fund terrorist 
organizations and drug cartels and to launder tainted 
proceeds.215  Customs must not only prevent the flow of illegal 
contraband and watch for terrorist communications, but the 
Agency is also responsible for monitoring the illegal flow of 
  
 210 See United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 211 Id. at 738-39. 
 212 The following scenario is easily imaginable: 
A suspected drug smuggler types anxiously into his [BlackBerry]. [Before 
arriving at the airport,] [h]e hurriedly writes an e-mail to an overseas 
accomplice, confirming plans for the importation of two tons of cocaine into 
the United States.  The smuggler’s highly incriminating message, if seized by 
law enforcement officers, could . . . place him in prison for life. 
Aaron Y. Strauss, Note, A Constitutional Crisis in the Digital Age: Why the FBI’s 
“Carnivore” Does Not Defy the Fourth Amendment, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 231, 
231 (2002). 
 213 Fortna, 796 F.2d at 738. 
 214 In 2001, “federal authorities seized 1,211 metric tons of marijuana,” more 
than 111 tons of cocaine, and nearly 6,000 pounds of heroin at the border.  DEA, Drug 
Trafficking in the United States, http://www.dea.gov/concern/drug_trafficking.html 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2006). 
 215 Michael Freedman, The Invisible Bankers, FORBES, Oct. 17, 2005, at 94. 
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tainted profits and funds used to support terrorist networks.216  
CBP works with several other agencies to enforce the 
prohibition of unlicensed money-transfer businesses217 and the 
carrying of currency in excess of $10,000 into or out of the 
country without reporting the sum to the federal government.218  
Terrorists and drug traffickers have used both of these 
methods “to finance their operations,” capitalizing on 
underground banking methods “as old as the Silk Road.”219  
These individuals rely heavily on an informal money transfer 
system that operates on the fringes of global banking: the 
hawala.220  Hawalas are underground banks that allow large 
sums of money to be transferred from establishments such as 
convenience stores to destinations all over the world. 221  The 
  
 216 Eric Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: The Money Trail; Agency to Expand 
Units Tracing Terrorist Finances, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A12.  Although 
technically a money-laundering offense under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C 
§ 1960 (2000), the funds illegally transferred from within the United States to terrorist 
organizations abroad actually “start off ‘clean’ and become ‘dirty’ [at a] later [time].”  
Freedman, supra note 215. 
 217 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (making it unlawful for one to “knowingly conduct[], 
control[], manage[], supervise[], direct[], or own[] all or part of an unlicensed money 
transmitting business” and subjecting a violator to fines and/or a prison sentence of  
not more than five years).  
 218 Lichtblau, supra note 216.  See 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a) (2000) (prohibiting such 
transportation of more than $10,000 into or out of the United States).  The USA 
PATRIOT Act enhanced both 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and 31 U.S.C. §5332 by sanctioning 
harsher punishment for money remitters and by elevating bulk cash smuggling from a 
currency reporting violation to a criminal offense.  News Release, ICE, ICE Financial 
Investigative Efforts Expand to Combat Growing Money Laundering Threat (Jan. 11, 
2006), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/060111washington.htm (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2006). 
 219 See Freedman, supra note 215. 
 220 See id. 
 221 Halawas—meaning “trust” or “exchange” in Arabic—originated on the 
Indian subcontinent as a way for merchants to avoid being robbed as they traveled.  Id.  
An individual wishing to send money abroad will visit the operator of a hawala, a 
hawalader, here in the U.S.  The hawalader will accept the money and a password 
which will serve as the only way to identify the sender.  The hawalader will then 
contact his colleague in the destination country, telling his or her partner the amount 
to pay the recipient and the password that will be used.  The sender then tells the 
recipient where to go and what code to use.  The money is picked up, and the two 
hawaladers settle the debt at a later time.  Id.  The identity of the sender, recipient, 
and the purpose for which the money will be used is rarely known by the informal 
bankers; at the very least this information is never recorded on paper.  Id.  See also 
Alan Beattie, Informal Foreign Cash Transfers Cheaper, Says Study, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Apr. 1, 2005, at 5.  Nearly 20,000 hawalas operate in the United States.  
Freedman, supra note 215.  In 2004, it is estimated that nearly thirty-five percent of 
the $150 billion in global transfers flowed through hawalas.  Id.  
  Another money transfer concern for both CBP and ICE is the “black-
market peso exchange,” a complex money laundering system used extensively by 
participants in the Colombian narcotics trade.  Lowell Bergman, U.S. Companies 
Tangled in Web of Drug Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2000, at A1.  The system involves 
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system leaves no paper trail from which one may identify the 
sender, the receiver, or the purpose for which the funds will be 
used.222  Obtaining evidence of participation in a hawala is 
difficult and has been a major source of frustration for federal 
law enforcement.223  Preventing the search and replication of 
electronic data would allow the concealment of the already 
sparse evidence that may be used to demonstrate participation 
in such illegal money transfers.224  Communications indicating 
involvement in unlicensed remittance systems, international 
money laundering schemes, and plans to smuggle large 
amounts of currency might be viewed by CBP under existing 
case law, but failing to apply Fortna would render that 
authority meaningless.  Without a way to duplicate hard 
evidence, currency smugglers and illegal money remitters will 
take advantage of a Fortna exemption for electronically stored 
data.  Customs will be greatly hindered in its ability to 
shutdown the pipelines that finance terrorism and those that 
not only support drug cartels but cleanse their profits.225 
Finally, the consequences of creating an exemption for 
digital information from search and reproduction at the border 
would nullify CBP’s authority to enforce laws protecting minors 
from sexual exploitation.226  The federal government 
successfully apprehends and prosecutes a large number of child 
pornographers and international sex tourists based on evidence 
CBP obtains during border searches.227  The ability to seize 
pornographic images of minors in paper form is not questioned 
and Customs has even done so outside the border search 
  
the cross border flow of large amounts of money and is a method of turning illegally 
earned American dollars into “clean” Colombian pesos.  Id. 
  In September 2005, Abad Elfgeeh, an immigrant from Yemen, was 
convicted of operating an unlicensed money transfer business responsible for sending 
more than $21.9 million dollars overseas.  Metro Briefing New York: Brooklyn: Store 
Owner Guilty of Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at B4.  Elfgeeh 
directed all funds from his ice cream shop in Brooklyn.  Id.  
 222 See Freedman, supra note 215. 
 223 See id. 
 224 See id.  
 225 See Lichtblau, supra note 216.  
 226 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-52 (2000) (prohibiting the possession, receipt, and 
transportation of child pornography);  see also 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2000) (prohibiting 
travel outside of the United States for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts with 
children under the age of eighteen). 
 227 See, e.g., ICE, Child-Exploitation, Operation Predator, http://www.ice.gov/ 
pi/predator/index.htm [hereinafter Operation Predator] (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). 
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context.228  But creating a sanctuary for digital information 
would undermine significant advances made in the fight 
against the sexual exploitation of minors.  Immunizing from 
replication the files contained in laptops, disks, PDAs, and 
memory cards would severely debilitate CBP in the effort to 
stop participants in and operators of the sex tourism industry. 
The advantage of allowing CBP to access computer and 
PDA hard drives and subsequently to reproduce information 
stored therein is clear.  Access to all electronic devices 
containing personal communications and images is vital to 
combat terrorism, narcotics trafficking, illegal money transfers, 
and child pornography.  In order to fully utilize its law 
enforcement authority, Customs must be able to reproduce 
evidence indicating the violation of federal law, or attempt or 
conspiracy to do the same.  Reasonable suspicion is the most 
realistic standard to be applied, not to the initial search of the 
object in question, but only to the duplication of material 
contained therein.229  Given the clandestine nature of 
smuggling violations and the millions of passengers processed 
by CBP on a daily basis, a higher standard of suspicion is 
impracticable.230 
D. Existing Protections and a New CBP Policy  
Existing protections imposed by case law, the federal 
government’s finite resources, and the oath taken by CBP 
employees to uphold the Constitution effectively, limit the 
ability of Customs to search and copy electronic material.  
These protections, combined with the adoption of an Agency-
wide non-retention policy for copied information, adequately 
safeguard the privacy interests of international travelers.   
First, case law has imposed a variety of restrictions on 
the border search doctrine that serve to protect the interests of 
travelers entering and leaving the United States.231  While the 
initial search of cargo may be conducted without suspicion, the 
copying of the information is subject to a higher standard.232  
  
 228 United States v. Spence, 397 F.3d 1280, 1282-85 (10th Cir. 2005) (denying 
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of child pornography seized by Customs 
officials). 
 229 See supra Part II.C. 
 230 Customs processes over one million inbound persons each day.  CBP, A 
Day in the Life, supra note 139. 
 231 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 232 United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738-39 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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Similarly, the downloading, copying, or scanning of digital 
information would have to be supported by an agent’s 
reasonable suspicion.  Second, CBP officers do not have general 
police powers.233  Customs officials may determine if goods are 
being unlawfully imported because the importer has failed to 
pay the appropriate duties on the items or because the goods 
are themselves contraband.234  Officers may enforce 
immigration laws and ensure that those noncitizens presenting 
themselves for entry are admissible and have the appropriate 
travel documents, entry visas, or passports.235  However, if 
seized by Customs, evidence indicating the violation of state 
law will be suppressed in later proceedings.236  
Third, the federal government has limited resources and 
although CBP possesses the authority to inspect everyone and 
everything crossing the border, in reality, they cannot.237  As a 
practical matter, computer or PDA searches could not possibly 
be conducted for the 1.1 million individuals the Agency must 
process on a daily basis.238  Faced with these limitations, 
Customs must reserve secondary inspection time for those 
situations in which independent circumstances indicate the 
need fore a more intrusive search.239  The search and seizure of 
electronic evidence is most likely to occur when the traveler’s 
unusual conduct or the presence of other incriminating items in 
their possession suggests the need for an agent to browse a 
  
 233 People v. LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d 394, 396 (App. Div. 1994).  See also 19 
U.S.C. § 1467 (2000).  CBP is responsible for policing 317 ports of entry and over 
101,900 miles of combined shoreline and land border area.  CBP, A Day in the Life, 
supra note 139. 
 234 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2000); see also LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97. 
 235 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2000). 
 236 LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 398.  
 237 CBP, CBP Authority to Search, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/ 
admissability/authority_to_search.xml (last visited Sept. 15, 2006) [hereinafter CBP, 
Authority to Search].  Those with diplomatic status are exempt from CBP processing.  
Id.  
  Customs often conducts more extensive secondary inspections for 
individuals who appear nervous or apprehensive and who have recently traveled to or 
are arriving from a narcotics source country.  See, e.g., Kaniff v. United States, 351 
F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (identifying Jamaica as a narcotics source country); 
United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (identifying Cambodia 
as a narcotics source country); United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1153 (5th Cir. 
1993) (identifying Nigeria as a known narcotics source country); United States v. 
Collins, 764 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 1985) (identifying Brazil as a narcotics source 
country). 
 238 CBP, A Day in the Life, supra note 139. 
 239 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005).  
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computer hard drive or the contents of a BlackBerry.240  In 
order to maximize limited resources, Customs utilizes the 
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) to help determine 
which arriving individuals are potentially non-compliant and 
should be targeted for secondary inspection.241 The efficient use 
of CBP time means that extensive, secondary inspections must 
be reserved for the appropriate occasions.  An individual search 
of all laptops, palm pilots, and memory sticks followed by the 
duplication of all digitally stored information is neither 
realistic nor resourceful.  
Additionally, the men and women who protect our 
borders have “sworn to uphold the Constitution.”242  As the 
Ninth circuit noted in United States v. Cortez-Rocha, these 
officers are not “cyborgs” set out to destroy private property 
and violate the privacy interest of travelers.243  Officers are 
trained, experienced professionals who may be counted on to 
carry out their responsibilities in an “intelligent and respectful” 
manner.244  Justice Breyer echoed similar sentiments in his 
concurring opinion in United States v. Flores-Montano, stating 
that the Agency retains records of invasive searches and the 
reasons such inspections are conducted.245  This process should 
eliminate many concerns regarding abuse of the border 
authority during processing.246  CBP officers are obligated to 
conduct border searches for a proper, good faith governmental 
  
 240 Id. (noting that officers did not inspect the defendant’s computer until they 
had discovered drug paraphernalia and photographs/video of child pornography).  
 241 CBP, Authority to Search, supra note 237.  IBIS is part of the Treasury 
Enforcement Communications System (TECS) and is utilized by regulatory and law 
enforcement personnel from the FBI, the DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), the U.S. Coast 
Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service.  Id.  The system “provides the law enforcement 
community with . . . files of common interest . . . and keeps track of information on 
suspected individuals, businesses, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels.”  Id.  CBP is similarly 
alerted when a warrant for the arrest of an inbound passenger has been issued via the 
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS).  Id. 
 242 United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 383 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(inserting additional material supporting the constitutionality of the border search), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 105 (2005), amended by 394 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id.  CBP provides for such situations.  If a traveler feels a search was not 
conducted in a professional manner, he or she may ask to speak with a Customs 
supervisor who is available twenty-four hours a day either at the Customs facility or by 
telephone.  Why U.S. Customs Conducts Examinations, http://www.ncbuy.com/travel/ 
articles.html?fid=10648 (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). 
 245 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 156 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 246 See id. 
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purpose “and . . . do not waste time on dead-end adventures.”247  
Any search conducted in bad faith is invalid, and any evidence 
obtained from a tainted inspection will be suppressed and 
subsequently unavailable to federal prosecutors.248  This good 
faith duty combined with limited federal resources will ensure 
that CBP authority to search and duplicate personal, 
electronically stored information is not abused.  
Finally, the implementation of an Agency-wide policy 
similar to that mandated in Heidy v. United States249 will serve 
as an additional element of protection for individuals who have 
personal information copied by Customs but who have not 
violated federal law.  When material in paper or electronic form 
is searched and reproduced, Customs must be able to retain 
those copies until it becomes evident that the material “no 
longer has any evidentiary, prosecut[orial], or investigative 
value.”250  This enables the Agency to retain information that 
may lead to the successful prosecution of drug traffickers, 
pedophiles, or perhaps the foiling of a terrorist plot.  However, 
once a determination is made that the evidence has no law 
enforcement value, the copies must be destroyed.  Detailed 
records of a non-violation describing the nature of the search 
and identifying the individual from whom the information was 
seized must not be maintained in a federal database.251  
Further, Customs must not share photocopied or reproductions 
of electronic files with other law enforcement agencies unless 
those agencies agree to abide by CBP’s policy of non-
retention.252  This will allay fears that records will be 
maintained and used to target individuals during future border 
crossings, thus inhibiting travel.253  The adoption and 
application of a Heidy policy will allow CBP to effectively police 
our borders and enforce federal law while shielding travelers 
from an experience like that of Franz Kafka’s fictional 
  
 247 Cortez-Rocha, 383 F.3d at 1097.  
 248 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) 
(establishing the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine). 
 249 681 F. Supp. 1445 (C.D. Cal. 1988).  While the court order in Heidy was 
binding on the former U.S. Customs Service regarding the enforcement of 19 U.S.C. § 
1305 (2000), which prohibits the importation of subversive material, the order is not 
currently binding on CBP as a new agency.  Neither CBP nor the Department of 
Homeland Security currently has a policy addressing the maintenance of reproductions 
of electronic evidence. 
 250 Heidy, 681 F. Supp. at 1447 n.6. 
 251 Id. at 1453.  
 252 Id. 
 253 See, e.g., id. at 1148 & n.8. 
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character Joseph K.254—knowing large amounts of personal 
information is in the hands of the government, but having no 
way to determine precisely what that information is, or for 
what purpose the material will be used.255  
VI. CONCLUSION  
The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment 
must be preserved in our increasingly digitized world.256  
Customs authority to conduct unwarranted and often 
suspicionless searches remains as critical to national security 
today as it was in the late eighteenth century when Congress 
passed the first customs.257  At the border, where our 
protectionist interest is “at its zenith,”258 immunity for 
electronic evidence from search and seizure would be 
disastrous. 
Customs has the authority to search all persons and 
items crossing the border; this is undisputed.259  This 
necessarily includes laptop computers, as explained in Ickes.260  
PDAs, memory cards, and other wireless communication 
devices are nearly identical to conventional laptop computers 
in terms of function and hard drive capabilities, differing only 
in size and portability.  The similarities in form and function 
mandate the extension of the Ickes holdings to all portable 
electronic items.  
The Agency’s authority to copy paper evidence 
indicating the violation of federal, Customs-enforced law is also 
well settled and appropriately subjected only to a standard of 
  
 254 Joseph K. is the protagonist of Franz Kafka’s 1925 novel, The Trial.  
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV 1393, 1419-21 (2001).  Joseph awakes one 
morning to find officials in his apartment.  Id.  He is arrested for reasons never 
revealed and subjected to judicial process by a court that has created a massive 
collection of data about his personal life that “‘pass[es] on to the highest Courts, being 
referred to the lower ones again . . . . No document is ever lost, the Court never forgets 
anything.  One day—quite unexpectedly—some Judge will take up the documents and 
look at them attentively . . . [a]nd the case begins all over again.’”  Id. at 1420 (quoting 
FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1937)).  See also Doe v. Se. 
Penn. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1135-37 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing plaintiff’s fear 
that records of his HIV status maintained in employer’s database would subject him to 
discrimination). 
 255 SOLOVE, supra note 159, at 67. 
 256 See supra Part V.A. 
 257 See supra note 41. 
 258 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
 259 See supra Part II. 
 260 See supra Part III. 
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reasonable suspicion.261  This authority must also be extended 
to modern, portable electronic devices and the large amount of 
information these objects may store.  While the sheer volume of 
personal materials that can be contained in a BlackBerry or 
palm pilot merits special consideration, the fact remains that 
one may not reasonably expect privacy at the border.  The 
medium has changed, but the logic of Fortna remains valid.  
Existing protections coupled with a policy of non-
retention adequately protect individual privacy interests.  If 
the Agency duplicates electronically stored information during 
a search and later determines that the individual from whom 
information was seized has not and is not conspiring to violate 
federal law, all copies will be destroyed.  The Agency would 
further refuse dissemination to other federal agencies unless 
compliance with this policy was secured.  
Customs and Border Protection has a daunting role in 
the law enforcement sector and the enormous responsibility of 
policing thousands of miles of land and coastline.  Failure to 
extend the border search doctrine and the principles of Fortna 
to all portable hand-held wireless devices and accompanying 
disks and memory sticks would severely handicap a federal law 
enforcement agency that plays a vital role in the protection of 
our country. 
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